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PHILOSOPHY AND EXEGESIS 
IN AL-FÂRÂBÎ, AVERROES, 
AND MAIMONIDES 
Carlos Fraenkel 
Department of Philosophy 
McGill University, Montreal 
RÉSUMÉ : À plusieurs égards, il est vrai d’avancer que Maïmonide et Averroès poursuivent le 
même projet philosophique et religieux. D’autant plus que tous deux ont été décrits comme des 
disciples d’al-Fârâbî, le fondateur de l’école de l’aristotélisme arabe (falsafa). Cependant, à 
première vue, leur œuvre ne pouvait pas être moins ressemblante : Averroès n’a écrit presque 
exclusivement que des commentaires sur Aristote, cependant que Maïmonide n’est l’auteur 
d’aucune œuvre qui appartienne à un genre philosophique dans le sens strict. Il est, d’un autre 
côté, un commentateur distingué lui aussi — sauf qu’il n’explique pas Aristote, mais commente 
et met de l’ordre dans la Loi de Moïse. La question principale dont je traite dans cet article, 
est celle de savoir si ce rapport tellement différent à la philosophie et à l’exégèse chez 
Averroès et Maïmonide peut être compris comme deux façons d’implémenter le cadre concep-
tuel établi par al-Fârâbî. Je commence par examiner le projet d’al-Fârâbî, que j’essaie d’ex-
pliquer par deux objectifs : reprendre et continuer le projet de la philosophie antique et définir 
sa place dans une société, dans laquelle l’autorité de la Loi divine n’est pas mise en question. 
Ensuite, je montre que, tandis que l’œuvre d’Averroès peut être comprise, dans l’ensemble, 
comme une continuation du projet d’al-Fârâbî, cela n’est pas vrai de la même façon pour 
l’œuvre de Maïmonide qui en partie transforme al-Fârâbî de manière créative et en partie 
utilise des prémisses dont on ne trouvera pas la source en al-Fârâbî. La position de Maïmo-
nide en ce qui concerne la philosophie et l’exégèse se distingue significativement de la position 
habituelle adoptée par les falâsifa, ce qui a eu des conséquences importantes pour la philoso-
phie juive médiévale après Maïmonide. 
ABSTRACT : Maimonides and Averroes shared in many respects a philosophical-religious outlook 
and have been described as disciples of al-Fârâbî, the founder of the school of Arabic Aristote-
lianism (falsafa). At first view, however, their legacy could hardly be more different : while 
Averroes wrote almost only commentaries on Aristotle, Maimonides did not write a single 
work that, strictly speaking, falls into a traditional philosophical genre. He is, on the other 
hand, a prominent commentator as well — only that instead of explicating Aristotle, he com-
ments on the Law of Moses. The main question I address in this paper is whether this strikingly 
different relation to philosophy and exegesis in Averroes and Maimonides can be explained as 
two ways of implementing a conceptual framework established by al-Fârâbî. I first examine al-
Fârâbî’s project, which I suggest is determined by a twofold task : to take up and continue the 
project of ancient philosophy and to define its place in a society in which the authority of the 
divine Law is undisputed. Then I argue that while Averroes’ work can on the whole be under-
stood as continuing al-Fârâbî’s project, this is only in a qualified way true for Maimonides 
who in part creatively transforms al-Fârâbî and in part relies on premises that can clearly not 
be derived from al-Fârâbî. Maimonides’ position on philosophy and exegesis is in important 
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respects different from the standard position of the falâsifa — and this had far-reaching impli-
cations for later medieval Jewish philosophy. 
______________________  
hen we turn from late Antiquity to Islamic and Jewish philosophy in the early 
Middle Ages, we can no longer focus exclusively on commentaries as a tech-
nique for doing philosophy. Of the three philosophers to be examined in this paper, 
Averroes wrote almost only commentaries on Aristotle, whereas Maimonides did not 
write a single work that falls into a traditional philosophical genre. And yet, they 
share in many respects the same philosophical-religious outlook. The way these phi-
losophers approach philosophy and exegesis is determined by a twofold task : to take 
up and continue the project of ancient philosophy and to define its place in a society 
in which the authority of the divine Law is undisputed. In this paper I will attempt to 
clarify how the roles of philosophy and exegesis were shaped by the strategies em-
ployed to carry out this twofold task. 
Averroes (d. 1198) and Maimonides (d. 1204) are the last two important repre-
sentatives of the falsafa tradition in Muslim Spain, an intellectual tradition that origi-
nated in the Muslim East with al-Fârâbî (d. 950).1 Al-Fârâbî is, of course, not the first 
Arabic philosopher, but I take it to be uncontroversial that the identity of falsafa as a 
self-conscious philosophical movement was largely shaped by him. Maimonides who 
is the most important Jewish representative of this school has been called “the disci-
ple of Alfarabi” by Lawrence Berman, because, according to Berman, he took al-
Fârâbî’s general theory of the relationship between philosophy, religion, theology, 
and jurisprudence and applied it to Judaism.2 The same can, I think, be said about 
most of the falâsifa. It certainly can be said for Averroes’ interpretation of Islam.3 A 
comparison between Averroes and Maimonides appears to be promising for several 
reasons. Both were born in Córdoba and received their scientific education in the 
                                       
 1. For background on the life and works of Averroes, see Dominique URVOY, Ibn Rushd (Averroès), Paris, 
Cariscript, 2005 ; for Maimonides, see Herbert A. DAVIDSON, Moses Maimonides : The Man and his 
Works [Maimonides], Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005. The most comprehensive study of al-
Fârâbî’s work to date is Philippe VALLAT, Farabi et l’École d’Alexandrie [Farabi], Paris, Vrin, 2004. But 
see my critical observations on Vallat’s main thesis below. 
 2. Lawrence BERMAN, “Maimonides, the Disciple of Alfarabi” [“Disciple”], Israel Oriental Studies, 4 
(1974), 154-178. For the high esteem, in which Maimonides held al-Fârâbî, see his letter to Samuel ibn 
Tibbon : “All that al-Fârâbî wrote, and in particular the Treatise on the Principles of Beings, is entirely 
without fault [solet neqiyyah] […] for he excelled in wisdom [haya muflag be-hokhmah]” (Letters of 
Maimonides [Letters], ed. Isaac SHAILAT, Jerusalem, Maaliyot Press, 1988, 553). 
 3. Much of the literature on Maimonides and Averroes in relation to al-Fârâbî was inspired by Leo STRAUSS, 
Philosophie und Gesetz. Beiträge zum Verständnis Maimunis und seiner Vorläufer [Philosophie und Ge-
setz], Berlin, Schocken Verlag, 1935. Although in this paper I cover much of the same material in which 
Strauss and his students were interested, it should soon become clear that I approach it from a very differ-
ent perspective. Despite a number of substantial critical reservations, my interpretation of al-Fârâbî’s pro-
ject is on the whole closer to the one proposed by Dominic O’MEARA, Platonopolis. Platonic Political 
Philosophy in Late Antiquity [Platonopolis], Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, chapter 14 and 
VALLAT, Fârâbî. For a critique of the Straussian understanding of al-Fârâbî’s political thought, see also 
Dimitri GUTAS, “The Study of Arabic Philosophy in the Twentieth Century,” British Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies, 29 (2002), 19-25. 
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context of Andalusian Aristotelianism. Both were not only philosophers, but also 
prominent doctors and experts in Islamic respectively Jewish law.4 Both dealt with 
the same philosophical problems of which the most important were al-Ghazâlî’s criti-
cism of the falâsifa, the incompatibility of Ptolemaic astronomy and Aristotelian ce-
lestial physics and the questions arising from the sceptical epistemology that al-
Fârâbî is reported to have set forth in his lost Commentary on the Nicomachean 
Ethics.5 Finally, Maimonides read Averroes’ commentaries on Aristotle and recom-
mended them to his students.6 If, then, it is true that Averroes and Maimonides were 
disciples of al-Fârâbî, and reshaped his legacy under a comparable set of circum-
stances, one would expect a comparison between them to yield many similarities. But 
a look at the corpus of their writings shows that the opposite is the case.7 The great 
majority of Averroes’ works are commentaries on Aristotle. They come in different 
formats and serve different purposes. Sometimes they take on the form of a system-
atic treatise on a philosophical topic, e.g. philosophical psychology or celestial phys-
ics. But all of them reflect what is undoubtedly Averroes’ central intellectual con-
cern : understanding Aristotle. Averroes also wrote a number of medical treatises and 
treatises on Islamic law. But in relation to his work on Aristotle these are clearly 
marginal. Finally, he also wrote three works that pertain to what can be described as 
philosophical theology. In these works, however, he states expressly that he would 
not have written them at all if al-Ghazâlî had not questioned the legitimacy of falsafa 
from the standpoint of Islam.8 For Averroes, then, philosophy and exegesis come to-
gether first and foremost in his impressive series of commentaries on Aristotle. 
Maimonides, by contrast, did not compose a single work that strictly speaking 
can be described as philosophical. The authenticity of the one that comes closest is 
                                       
 4. See the literature quoted above, n. 1. In addition, see Dominique URVOY, Pensers d’Al-Andalus : la vie 
intellectuelle à Cordoue et Seville au temps des empires berbères, Paris, CNRS, Presses Universitaires du 
Mirail, 1990 ; Joel KRAEMER, “Maimonides and the Spanish Aristotelian School,” in Mark D. MEYERSON, 
Edward D. ENGLISH, ed., Christians, Muslims, and Jews in Medieval and Early Modern Spain : Interac-
tion and Cultural Change, Notre Dame, Notre Dame University Press, 1999, 40-68. 
 5. See, e.g. A.I. SABRA, “The Andalusian Revolt against Ptolemaic Astronomy : Averroes and al-Bitruji,” in 
Everett MENDELSOHN, ed., Transformation and Tradition in the Sciences, Cambridge, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1984, 133-153 ; Shlomo PINES, “La philosophie dans l’économie du genre humain selon Aver-
roès : une réponse à Al-Fârâbî ?,” in Multiple Averroès, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 189-207 ; ID., “Les limi-
tes de la métaphysique selon al-Farabi, Ibn Bajja, et Maïmonide. Sources et antithèses de ces doctrines 
chez Alexandre d’Aphrodise et chez Themistius,” Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 13 (1981), 211-225. 
 6. In a letter to Joseph ben Judah, Maimonides writes that he has received Averroes’ commentaries on Aris-
totle except for the commentary on De sensu et sensibili and that he has “read enough to perceive that 
[Averroes] has hit the truth with great precision,” even though he lacks the time to study the commentaries 
in depth. In the letter to Ibn Tibbon quoted above, he recommends Averroes’ commentaries next to those 
of Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius (Letters, 553). There is, however, no conclusive evidence that 
Maimonides’ works were influenced by Averroes. See the section on “Averroes” in Shlomo PINES, 
“Translator’s Introduction : The Philosophical Sources of The Guide of the Perplexed” [“Sources”] in his 
trans. of the Guide, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1963, CVIII-CXXIII. 
 7. For the following, see again the literature quoted in n. 1. 
 8. See AVERROES, Fa├l al-maqâl [The Decisive Treatise], ed. by George HOURANI, with corrections by 
Muhsin MAHDI, trans. Charles Butterworth, Provo, Brigham Young University Press, 2001, 23 [Fa├l]. 
Kitâb al-kashf [The Book of Exposition], ed. M. QASIM, Cairo, 1964, trans. I. Najjar, in Faith and Reason 
in Islam, Oxford, Oneworld, 2001, Ar. 184-185 ; Eng. 70-71 [Kashf]. 
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disputed : his Maqâla fî ├inâ‛at al-man└iq [Treatise on the Art of Logic] that he is 
said to have written in his youth.9 But even if Maimonides did, in fact, compose it, it 
falls into the genre of “introductions to philosophy” that goes back to Porphyry’s 
Eisagôgê. It leads to the threshold of philosophy, as it were, without being philoso-
phy itself.10 Maimonides is, on the other hand, a prominent commentator as well. 
Only that his commentaries do not explicate Aristotle, but the Law of Moses. His first 
important work is the Sirâj [Light], his Arabic commentary on the Mishna. His last 
important work — usually referred to as his chief philosophical work — is the 
Dalâlat al-╕â’irîn [The Guide of the Perplexed], which is at least presented as a book 
of Biblical exegesis. According to the introduction, Maimonides’ goal is to explain to 
perplexed Jewish intellectuals “the meanings of certain terms,” as well as “very ob-
scure parables occurring in the books of the prophets” in order to show to them that 
no real conflict exists between the teachings of the prophets and the teachings of the 
philosophers.11 In addition to explaining the Law of Moses as a commentator, Mai-
monides also puts order into it as a jurisprudent, most importantly in the Mishneh To-
rah, his 14-volume code of Jewish law. But if for Maimonides exegesis consists first 
and foremost in explaining and systematizing the Law of Moses, this does not mean 
that he is not in important ways concerned with philosophy in general and with Aris-
totle in particular. In fact, Maimonides’ most orthodox expression of Aristotelianism 
occurs in the opening four chapters of the Sefer ha-madda‘ [Book of Knowledge], the 
first book of the Mishneh Torah that begins by stating the Hilkhot yesode ha-torah 
[Laws Concerning the Foundations of the Torah]. As the “foundations of the Torah,” 
it turns out, Maimonides legislates a set of opinions that amount to a summary of Ar-
istotle’s metaphysics and physics : from the existence of God, inferred from the eter-
nal motion of the celestial spheres all the way down to the four elements of the sub-
lunar world.12 But to find Aristotle here of all places clearly does not mitigate the 
sense that Averroes and Maimonides have left markedly different legacies behind. 
The main question that I would like to address, therefore, is whether this strik-
ingly different relation to philosophy and exegesis in Averroes and Maimonides can 
be explained as two ways of implementing a conceptual framework established by al-
Fârâbî. In other words : are the projects of the commentator on Aristotle and of the 
commentator on Moses projects of two disciples of al-Fârâbî ? The thesis for which I 
will argue is that this is on the whole the case for Averroes, but only in a qualified 
                                       
 9. See DAVIDSON, Maimonides, 313-322. 
 10. On the transmission of this genre into the Islamic world, see Angela JAFFRAY, On the Threshold of Phi-
losophy : A Study of Al-Fârâbî’s Introductory Works on Logic [Threshold], Ph. D. Dissertation, Harvard, 
2000. 
 11. References are to the edition of the Arabic source by Salomon MUNK and Issachar JOEL, Jerusalem, Juno-
vitch, 1930-1931, 2 and to Pines’ trans., 5-6. Compare also the programmatic statement in Guide II, 2. The 
Guide, of course, is a complex book and gave rise to much debate about its nature and purpose. But my 
goal in this paper is to explain why it is presented as a work of exegesis. For a good overview of interpre-
tations, see Aviezer RAVITZKY, “The Secrets of the Guide of the Perplexed : Between the Thirteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries,” in Isadore TWERSKY, ed., Studies in Maimonides, Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press, 1990, 159-207. 
 12. Sefer ha-madda‘, Jerusalem, Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1993. 
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way for Maimonides. Maimonides’ philosophical-exegetical project, I will try to 
show, is in part based on al-Fârâbî, in part creatively transforms al-Fârâbî and in part 
relies on premises that can clearly not be derived from al-Fârâbî. Although in parts of 
this paper I will build on much important earlier scholarship on the three authors to 
be examined, the specific question that I laid out above has to the best of my knowl-
edge not yet been satisfactorily answered. 
I. AL-FÂRÂBÎ 
Let me begin by outlining my understanding of al-Fârâbî’s project. Al-Fârâbî 
sees himself as inheriting and continuing the project of ancient philosophy of which 
in turn he has a distinctive conception : in the Kitâb al-╕urûf [Book of Letters] the 
second-highest and the highest stage in his curious account of the development of 
human knowledge are associated with Plato and Aristotle. At “the time of Plato,” 
knowledge has reached the epistemic status that can be achieved by dialectical 
means. But only in “Aristotle’s time,” al-Fârâbî writes, “scientific speculation [al-
nazar al-‛ilmî] is completed, the mathematical methods are all distinguished, theoreti-
cal philosophy and universal practical philosophy are perfected, and they cease to 
contain any object of examination. It becomes an art that is only learned and 
taught.”13 Elsewhere he writes that true philosophy “was handed down to us by the 
Greeks from Plato and Aristotle alone.”14 But note that the account in the ╖urûf is 
clearly not meant to be primarily historical. It is a theoretical model of how human 
knowledge evolves assuming an absolute starting point that al-Fârâbî illustrates by 
what he takes to be the development of Greek philosophy.15 In fact, in Ta╕├îl he 
traces the origin of philosophy back to Ancient Mesopotamia, from where it was 
transmitted to “the people of Egypt, from there to the Greeks, where it remained until 
it was transmitted to the Syrians and then to the Arabs.”16 Since al-Fârâbî wrote most 
of his works in Baghdad, the political and intellectual capital of the Abbasid caliph-
ate, this passage seems to suggest that by taking up the project of ancient philosophy, 
he is merely returning philosophy to where it originally came from.17 In yet another 
text that is important for this discussion — Fî zuhûr al-falsafa [On the Appearance of 
Philosophy] — al-Fârâbî draws a line that through a long chain of intermediaries 
                                       
 13. Kitâb al ╕urûf [Hurûf], ed. Muhsin MAHDI, Beirut, Dâr al-Mashriq, 1969, secs. 142-143 ; trans. of Book 2 
in Medieval Islamic Philosophical Writings, ed. Muhammad KHALIDI, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2005. 
 14. Ta╕├îl al-sa‛âda [The Attainment of Happiness], in Al-A‛māl al-falsafīyah, ed. J. AL-YASIN, Beirut, 1992, 
119-225 ; trans. Muhsin Mahdi in Al-Farabi’s Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, Ithaca, Cornell University 
Press, 1962, Ar. 196 ; Eng. 49. 
 15. Cf. secs. 114-146. 
 16. Ta╕├îl, Ar. 181 ; Eng. 43. 
 17. On this motive, cf. Dimitri GUTAS, Greek Thought, Arabic Culture : The Graeco-Arabic Translation Move-
ment in Baghdad and Early Abbasid Society [Graeco-Arabic Translation], London, New York, Routledge, 
1998, chapter 2. 
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leads from Aristotle to himself.18 He suggests that after the pagan period Christian 
authorities prohibited the teaching of those parts of the philosophical curriculum that 
were perceived as a threat to Christian doctrines, and then presents himself as the first 
to restore philosophy to its full scope in the context of Islam.19 As historical docu-
ments these texts are, of course, of little interest. But they allow us to see how al-
Fârâbî situates himself in relation to ancient philosophy and how he conceives his 
own role in the process of philosophy’s transmission to the Muslim world. His self-
presentation clearly corresponds to how he was perceived by later falâsifa who take 
him to be the foremost philosophical authority after Aristotle.20 
Much of al-Fârâbî’s work can be understood in light of the task he set himself of 
taking up the project of ancient philosophy, culminating in the writings of Plato and 
Aristotle. This task, I suggest, he conceived as twofold. For one thing the writings of 
the Greek philosophers that had recently become available in Arabic translation 
needed to be explained.21 For having a translation and understanding it are clearly 
two different things. They needed to be explained for two related reasons : firstly, be-
cause for al-Fârâbî, as we will see shortly, these writings provide the key to attaining 
happiness and human perfection and secondly, to ensure the continuation of the 
transmission of philosophy, which al-Fârâbî had traced from Aristotle to himself. The 
second task consists in clarifying the relationship of philosophy to the divine Law. 
This was an urgent task for a number of reasons. Al-Kindî (d. ca. 870), for instance, 
had made unacceptable philosophical compromises in al-Fârâbî’s view in order to 
integrate philosophy into an Islamic framework — so much so that he is passed over 
in silence in al-Fârâbî’s account of the “appearance of philosophy” in Islam.22 We 
saw, moreover, that Christian authorities, according to that same account, had pro-
hibited teaching parts of the philosophical curriculum for religious reasons. On the 
opposite side of the intellectual spectrum Muslim freethinkers, such as Abû Bakr al-
Râzî, called into question that prophetic guidance was required at all given the guid-
ance of the intellect that God had bestowed on all human beings. The plurality of 
                                       
 18. The text is attributed to him by Ibn Abî U├aybi‛a in ‛Uyûn al-anbâ’ fî tabaqât al-a└ibbâ’ [‛Uyûn], ed. August 
MÜLLER, Königsberg, 1884, Vol. 2, 134-135. Much has been written on this text. See e.g. Dimitri GUTAS, 
“The ‘Alexandria to Baghdad’ Complex of Narratives : A Contribution to the Study of Philosophical and 
Medical Historiography among the Arabs,” Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, 10 
(1999), 155-193. 
 19. On the anti-Byzantine stance reflected in the assessment of the Christians, cf. GUTAS, Graeco-Arabic 
Translation, chapter 4.2. The issue seems to hinge on the teaching of the Posterior Analytics containing 
Aristotle’s theory of the scientific syllogism. For al-Fârâbî this is, of course, crucial given his concept of 
philosophy as a demonstrative science. 
 20. Avicenna, for instance, al-Fârâbî’s most important successor in the Muslim East, relates in his autobiogra-
phy (Sîrat al-shaykh al-ra’îs, ed. and trans. William GOHLMANN, New York, SUNY Press, 1974, 34-35) 
how he studied Aristotle’s Metaphysics many times, but only succeeded in understanding it when he read it 
with a commentary by al-Fârâbî. For the Muslim West, see Maimonides’ praise of al-Fârâbî quoted above, 
n. 2. For the appreciation of al-Fârâbî’s work on logic by Averroes and his students, see Ibn ┘umlûs, 
Madkhal li-├inâ‛at al-man└iq [Introduction to the Art of Logic], ed. and Spanish trans. M. ASIN, Madrid, 
Centro de Estudios Historicos, 1916, 14-15 [Madkhal]. 
 21. On the translation movement, see GUTAS, Graeco-Arabic Translation. 
 22. On al-Kindî, see Peter ADAMSON, Al-Kindî, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006. On al-Kindî and al-
Fârâbî, see in particular 14-18. 
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prophetic religions, moreover, and their claim to exclusive truth had only given rise 
to destructive religious strife in Râzî’s view.23 We know that al-Fârâbî wrote a refuta-
tion of one of Râzî’s works, the Kitâb al-‛ilm al-ilâhî [Book of Divine Science].24 
Unfortunately neither Râzî’s work nor al-Fârâbî’s response have been preserved, but 
quotations from Râzî by later authors suggest that the book contained aggressive anti-
prophetic statements.25 Thus a number of questions arise. Must the philosophy of 
Aristotle be modified in order to fit into an Islamic framework ? Must it be partially 
prohibited ? And conversely, does the divine Law become redundant if we can rely 
on the guidance of the intellect ? 
Al-Fârâbî’s twofold task, as I suggested describing it, reflects challenges specific 
to introducing philosophy to the Muslim world. While historians of Islamic philoso-
phy broadly agree that al-Fârâbî’s intellectual outlook was significantly shaped by the 
late Alexandrian tradition of Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle, the continuity 
between the philosophical curriculum in late ancient Alexandria and early medieval 
Baghdad accounts only partly for al-Fârâbî’s project.26 
Let me start, then, with the first task and offer a hypothetical reconstruction of 
how al-Fârâbî’s writings can be related to it. I do, of course, not claim that it corre-
sponds to the chronological order in which al-Fârâbî wrote his works or to a precon-
ceived plan that he systematically executed. The reconstruction is meant as no more 
than an interpretation of how several parts of al-Fârâbî’s corpus fit together. To begin 
with the project of ancient philosophy itself needs to be clarified. The general outline 
that al-Fârâbî provides in Ta╕├îl al-sa‛âda shows that he takes its central concern to 
be an inquiry into the constituents of “sa‛âda [happiness]” and into how to attain and 
to disseminate it. In Falsafat Aflâ└ûn [The Philosophy of Plato] and Falsafat 
Aris└û└âlîs [The Philosophy of Aristotle] al-Fârâbî goes on to explain how this project 
informs the corpus of Plato’s and Aristotle’s writings.27 Of course the question arises 
whether Plato and Aristotle can be taken to pursue the same project at all. Although 
we saw that for al-Fârâbî Aristotle is superior to Plato, he stresses that the “purpose” 
of their respective philosophy is the same.28 Hence he writes a treatise that aims to 
                                       
 23. Râzî’s anti-prophetic works are not extant. The most important source for establishing their content is the 
refutation of Râzî’s arguments by the Ismâ‘îlî Abû ╖âtim al-Râzî in his A‛lâm al-nubuwwa [The signs of 
prophecy], ed. Salah AL-SAWY, Tehran, 1977. For a French translation of the relevant parts of the debate, 
see F. BRION, “Philosophie et révélation. Traduction annotée de six extraits du Kitâb A‛lâm al-Nubuwwa 
d’Abû ╖âtim al-Râzî,” Bulletin de philosophie médiévale, 28 (1986), 134-162. For an excellent recon-
struction of Râzî’s views, see Sarah STROUMSA, Freethinkers of Medieval Islam : Ibn al-Rawândî, Abû 
Bakr al-Râzî and their Impact on Islamic Thought [Freethinkers], Leiden, Brill, 1999, especially chapter 3. 
 24. The treatise is mentioned twice by Ibn Abî U├aybi‛a, ‛Uyûn, 608. 
 25. On al-Fârâbî and Râzî, cf. STROUMSA, Freethinkers, 188-192. 
 26. For all aspects of the transmission of philosophical writings in Greek, Syrian, and Arabic contexts, see the 
papers in Cristina D’ANCONA, The Libraries of the Neoplatonists, Leiden, Brill, 2007. The main thesis set 
forth by VALLAT is that the Platonic tradition is the only key to understanding al-Fârâbî’s work. See e.g. 
Farabi, 26. In my view this is an exaggeration. Vallat’s argument for al-Fârâbî’s philosophical training by 
pagan Neoplatonists in Harrân is, moreover, speculative. See Farabi, Introduction générale. 
 27. The former was edited by F. ROSENTHAL and R. WALZER, London, Warburg Institute, 1943 ; the latter by 
M. MAHDI, Beirut, 1961. 
 28. Ta╕├îl, Ar. 196 ; Eng. 50. 
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harmonize their views on issues on which they appear to disagree.29 Next the system-
atic structure of the scientific curriculum needs to be established which al-Fârâbî does 
most prominently in his I╕├â’ al-‛ulûm [Enumeration of the Sciences].30 A number of 
introductory works exhort to or prepare for the study of philosophy.31 After all these 
preliminary steps have been completed the strictly philosophical work can begin : the 
explanation of Aristotle, mainly in form of commentaries, but also in form of treatises 
that elucidate a topic in a systematic manner. Since Aristotle is taken to be in agree-
ment with Plato and at the same time superior to him, no explanation of Plato is re-
quired. Al-Fârâbî stresses that the Greek philosophers did not only leave an outline of 
philosophy itself, but also of “the ways to it and of the ways to re-establish it when it 
becomes confused or extinct.”32 By “the ways” he certainly means Aristotle’s logic, 
and the Organon clearly stood at the center of his interest. He commented on all parts 
of the Organon as it had been established in the late ancient Alexandrian tradition — 
from Porphyry’s Eisagôgê to the Rhetoric, and the Poetics.33 This should not surprise 
us. If al-Fârâbî’s goal is to establish philosophy in the Islamic world, providing the 
“instrument” for establishing it must be a central concern to him. Much of al-Fârâbî’s 
authority for philosophers like Averroes and Maimonides rests, in fact, on his out-
standing contribution to logic.34 But al-Fârâbî also wrote commentaries and treatises 
on the philosophical sciences properly speaking, both the theoretical sciences — 
mathematics, physics, psychology, metaphysics — and the practical sciences — eth-
ics and politics.35 
I turn now to the second part of al-Fârâbî’s task : determining the relationship 
between philosophy and the divine Law. This task is carried out in the framework of 
al-Fârâbî’s political philosophy which in turn was mainly shaped by Plato. Scholars 
have long wondered why Aristotle’s Politics was not translated into Arabic and why 
al-Fârâbî — and medieval Muslim and Jewish philosophers in general — turned to 
Plato rather than Aristotle for their political philosophy despite considering Aristotle 
superior to Plato.36  But recall that Aristotle’s superiority, according to al-Fârâbî, 
stems from the fact that his scientific method is superior to Plato’s. Whereas in 
                                       
 29. Kitâb al-jam‛ bayna ra’yay al-╕akîmayn Aflâ└ûn al-ilâhî wa-Aris└û└âlîs [The Harmonization of the Opin-
ions of the Two Sages, Plato the Divine and Aristotle], ed. and French trans. Fawzi NAJJAR and Dominique 
MALLET, Institut français de Damas, 1999 ; Eng. trans. C. Butterworth, in The Political Writings : Selected 
Aphorisms and Other Texts, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2001 [Jam‘]. 
 30. Ed. U. AMIN, Cario, 1968. 
 31. See e.g. Kitâb al-tanbîh ‛alâ sabîl al-sa‛âda [Exhortation to the Path of Happiness], ed. J. AL-YASIN, Bei-
rut, 1985 ; Eng. trans. in JAFFRAY, Threshold, 401-430. See Jaffray for a comprehensive study of this 
genre’s place in al-Fârâbî’s work. 
 32. Ta╕├îl, Ar. 196 ; Eng. 50. 
 33. On the inclusion of the Rhetoric and Poetics into the Organon and its philosophical implications, see Deb-
orah BLACK, Logic and Aristotle’s “Rhetoric” and “Poetics” in Medieval Arabic Philosophy [Logic], Lei-
den, Brill, 1990. For a convenient recent bibliography of al-Fârâbî’s commentaries, see VALLAT, Farabi, 
379-380. 
 34. For Averroes, see Ibn ┘UMLÛS, Madkhal, 14-15. For Maimonides, see Letters, 553. 
 35. See again the bibliography in VALLAT, Farabi. 
 36. See e.g. Shlomo PINES, “Aristotle’s Politics in Arabic Philosophy,” Israel Oriental Studies, 5 (1975), 150-
160. 
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Plato’s time knowledge was still pursued by means of dialectics, in Aristotle’s time 
“scientific speculation” was “completed” i.e. reached the stage of “burhân [demon-
stration],” the method set forth in the Posterior Analytics. Aristotle himself, however, 
stresses that “political philosophy” is not an exact science. Its premises and conclu-
sions are only “generally [epi to polu]” and not necessarily true.37 For medieval Mus-
lim and Jewish philosophers this means that political philosophy by its nature cannot 
generate more than dialectical propositions.38 Hence even on al-Fârâbî’s conception 
of Greek intellectual history Plato would seem to be as good as Aristotle with regard 
to political philosophy. Plato, of course, had given more thought to political issues 
than Aristotle. And the way he proposes to conceive the relationship between phi-
losophy and political power in a virtuous polis and the role of philosophy in the 
pedagogical-political guidance of the citizens to virtue provided a much better con-
ceptual framework for interpreting Islam and Judaism as philosophical religions than 
Aristotle’s Politics. It is also not true that Aristotle plays no role in al-Fârâbî’s politi-
cal thought. First and foremost the Organon, but also the De anima and the Nico-
machean Ethics provide crucial concepts that are integrated into the overall Platonic 
framework.39 We will see an example of this below. Let me finally add that recent 
scholarship has on the whole convincingly argued that also in his political thought al-
Fârâbî was significantly influenced by Neoplatonic traditions and is best understood 
in the context of the Neoplatonic reception of Plato’s political philosophy.40 How, 
then, did Plato’s political philosophy prove useful to al-Fârâbî for determining the 
relationship between philosophy and the divine Law ?41 
Throughout Plato’s dialogues, the goal of his philosophical-political project re-
mains the same : to make the citizens better by leading them to virtue.42 In the So-
cratic dialogues the key to virtue is knowledge which the Socrates of the Apology 
thinks is to some extent accessible to all citizens.43 Knowing what is good for Socra-
                                       
 37. Nicomachean Ethics I 3, 1094 b21-22. 
 38. Al-Fârâbî’s commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics is not extant, but see the distinction between “neces-
sary [hekhrahi]” and “general [me’odi]” drawn in the preserved Hebrew version of Averroes’ Middle Com-
mentary, ed. Lawrence BERGMAN, Jerusalem, The Israel Academy of Sciences, 1999, 60-61. The same 
consideration underlies Maimonides’ claim that “truth and falsehood” can only be predicated of “what is of 
necessity,” but not of “generally accepted things [al-mashhûrât]” (Guide I, 2, Ar. 16 ; Eng. 25). 
 39. On the importance of the Rhetoric and Poetics in this context, see BLACK, Logic. 
 40. See O’MEARA, Platonopolis, chapter 14 and the overall thesis of VALLAT, Farabi. Whether al-Fârâbî, in 
fact, read Plato’s dialogues — in particular the Laws of which he wrote a summary — is debated among 
scholars. Steven HARVEY, the most recent contributor to the debate, reaches a negative conclusion with re-
spect to the Laws. See “Can a Tenth-Century Islamic Aristotelian Help Us Understand Plato’s Laws ?”, in 
Luc BRISSON, Samuel SCOLNICOV, ed., Plato’s Laws : From Theory into Practice, Sankt Augustin, Aca-
demia Verlag, 2003, 320-330. My interpretation does not depend on deciding this issue. Whether he read 
Plato, summaries of Plato, or Neoplatonic sources does not affect my claim concerning the Platonic character 
of how he conceives the relationship between philosophy and the divine Law. 
 41. The following summary is based on what I have worked out at length in a forthcoming paper : “Making the 
Citizens Better : From Socratic Politics to Plato’s Political Philosophy in the Middle and Late Dialogues.” 
 42. For a number of characteristic passages, see Apology 25a-c ; Protagoras 318c-d ; 319e-320b ; Gorgias 464b-
465a ; 515b-521d ; Republic 420b-421c ; Statesman 296e-297b ; Laws 630a-631d ; 650b. 
 43. See e.g. Apology 29d ff. ; 30e ; 33b. 
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tes is a necessary and sufficient condition for doing what is good.44 Political success 
thus consists in directing the citizens through philosophical inquiry to knowledge.45 
But from the middle dialogues onwards Plato no longer considered knowledge as suf-
ficient for the task. When he came to see the human soul as having both rational and 
irrational parts, and most souls as dominated by one of the latter, the problem of non-
philosophers — i.e. of those who cannot be led to virtue through philosophy — be-
came a central concern for him.46 My understanding of Plato’s solution is this. Al-
though philosophy remains a necessary condition for becoming perfectly virtuous, all 
human beings can be led to a lower level of virtue through a pedagogical-political 
program designed by philosophers for non-philosophers. This explains the elaborate 
discussion that Plato devotes to non-philosophical devices — most strikingly in the 
Laws. The program’s main components are religious stories, laws, persuasive 
speeches, and religious practices. The crucial point for my purpose is that Plato aban-
dons the Socratic attempt, portrayed in the Apology, to lead all citizens to virtue 
through philosophical inquiry. In the Republic, Plato, in fact, explicitly criticizes the 
use of the elenchos for testing the beliefs of non-philosophers, since it will cause 
them to loose the traditional beliefs in which they were brought up and they lack the 
ability to “discover the true ones.” After having been “law-abiding,” therefore, they 
“become lawless.”47 
Al-Fârâbî adopts Plato’s fundamental premise that human beings are unequal by 
nature and divided into a minority of philosophers and a majority of non-philoso-
phers.48 In Falsafat Aflâ└ûn, moreover, he clearly distinguishes between the Socratic 
method and the method advocated in Plato’s later dialogues. “Socrates,” he claims, 
was only able “to conduct a scientific investigation of justice and the virtues […] but 
did not possess the ability to form the character of the youth and the multitude [al-
a╕dâth wa-al-jumhûr].” The “philosopher, the king, and the lawgiver,” by contrast, 
must be able to do both : to instruct “the elect [al-khawâ├├]” by means of “the So-
cratic method” and to form the character of “the youth and the multitude” by means 
of a pedagogical-political program.49 From al-Fârâbî’s Jawâmi‛ kitâb al-nawâmîs li-
Aflâ└ûn [Epitome of Plato’s Laws],50 we know that at a minimum, he was familiar 
with the main traits of the pedagogical-political program that Plato had worked out in 
the Laws.51 
                                       
 44. See e.g. Charmides 174b-c ; Laches 199d-e ; Protagoras 351b ff. 
 45. Hence Plato praises Socrates as the only Athenian to practice “the true craft of politics” (Gorgias 521d) 
 46. See e.g. Republic 581b-c. The development of Plato’s psychology and its ethical implications have been the 
object of a considerable amount of scholarship. See e.g. A.W. PRICE, Mental Conflict, London, New York, 
Routledge, 1995, chapters 1 and 2 ; and Terence IRWIN, Plato’s Ethics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1995. 
 47. See the entire passage 538c-539a. 
 48. For the former, see Kitâb al-siyâsa al-madanîyya [The Political Regime], ed. F. NAJJAR, Beirut, 1964 ; 
partial Eng. trans. F. Najjar, in R. LERNER, M. MAHDI, ed., Medieval Political Philosophy, Ithaca, New 
York, Cornell University Press, 1972 ; Ar. 89-91 ; Eng. 44 ; for the latter, see Ta╕├îl, Ar. 177-178 ; Eng. 41. 
 49. Falsafat Aflâ└ûn [The Philosophy of Plato], Ar. 21-22 ; Eng. 66-67. 
 50. Ed. T.-A. DRUART, Bulletin d’études orientales, 50 (1998), 109-155. 
 51. As I mentioned above (n. 40) the Epitome is not conclusive evidence that al-Fârâbî read the Laws. 
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We saw that in the ╖urûf, al-Fârâbî describes the process by which the theoretical 
and practical sciences reach perfection. This is followed by an outline of the two 
methods used for disseminating the results of this process to the political community. 
They correspond precisely to the two methods that we just saw : the “instruction” of 
philosophers “proceeds by demonstrative methods,” whereas the instruction of non-
philosophers, “which is public, proceeds by dialectical, rhetorical, or poetical meth-
ods.” This second kind of instruction in turn constitutes “religion [milla]” which al-
Fârâbî takes to be an “imitation of philosophy [mu╕âkîyya li-l-falsafa].”52 Religion 
thus conceived fulfills precisely the role of Plato’s pedagogical-political program : 
“through religion, the multitude is taught, educated, and given all that is needed to 
attain happiness.”53 Its purpose is to convey “theoretical and practical matters that 
have been inferred in philosophy, in such a way as to enable the multitude to under-
stand them by persuasion or imaginative representation, or both.”54 Religion thus 
serves as the “tool” of philosophy which makes philosophical contents accessible to 
non-philosophers.55 God’s description as a king in Scripture, for instance, is seen as a 
pedagogically useful metaphorical imitation of the philosophical doctrine of God oc-
cupying the first rank in the hierarchy of existents. The notion of the king conveys an 
approximate idea of God’s rank to non-philosophers who cannot understand the on-
tological order, but who do understand the political order.56 
Plato’s philosopher-king who has the task of guiding both philosophers and non-
philosophers to the perfection and happiness possible to them is replaced by al-Fârâbî 
through the prophet.57 The virtuous political community is, therefore, by the same to-
ken a virtuous religious community. The difference between the philosopher and the 
prophet is explained in terms of Aristotle’s psychology : the prophet has not only per-
fected his intellect like the philosopher, but he also has a perfect imagination. And 
one of the imagination’s functions, according to al-Fârâbî, is precisely “to imitate” 
things.58 In other words, the prophet is not only a philosopher, but a poet and orator 
as well which allows him to guide both the philosophers and the non-philosophers in 
his community. It should be clear by now how the late ancient version of the Or-
ganon is integrated into this Platonic framework : the prophet instructs philosophers 
by presenting them propositions about things as they truly are and then leads them to 
assent by providing a demonstration. To non-philosophers, on the other hand, he pre-
                                       
 52. Ta╕├îl, Ar. 185 ; Eng. 44. Al-Fârâbî’s most elaborate discussion of religion is the Kitâb al-milla [Book of 
Religion], ed. Muhsin MAHDI, Beirut, 1968. 
 53. ╖urûf, sec. 144. 
 54. Ibid., sec. 108. 
 55. Ibid., sec. 110. 
 56. See e.g. Ta╕├îl, Ar. 185 ; Eng. 45, quoted by Averroes in his Commentary on Plato’s Republic of which a 
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30. Cf. Guide I, 8-9. 
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Citizens of the Virtuous City], ed. and trans. Richard WALZER, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1985 [Mabâdi’]. 
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sents propositions that for the most part poetically imitate reality and then leads them 
to assent through rhetorical or dialectical arguments.59 Thus religious texts for al-
Fârâbî consist mainly of metaphors, parables, and rhetorical and dialectical argu-
ments. 
One implication of conceiving religion as an “imitation” of philosophy is that 
much of its content will be false if understood literally. God, for example, according 
to the philosopher, is not truly a king as he is poetically represented in Scripture. But 
the representation is true if it is understood as a metaphor for God’s ontological rank. 
A religious text is thus true when considered in terms of its allegorical content, i.e. 
when the imitated doctrine is made visible behind the imitation. That al-Fârâbî is 
aware of these implications is clear from his considerations of what occurs when a 
community adopts from another community both a virtuous religion and the philoso-
phical sciences which that religion imitates. In this case neither the philosophers nor 
the non-philosophers know that their newly acquired religion is an imitation of their 
newly acquired philosophy. As a consequence, they will perceive the two as being in 
conflict. For the philosophers, al-Fârâbî claims, this conflict will be resolved once 
they learn that the seemingly false content of the religion consists in parables repre-
senting true doctrines. The philosophers are then called to “oppose” the “assumption” 
of non-philosophers “that religion is in conflict with philosophy.” They “strive to rid 
[the non-philosophers] of this assumption by seeking to make them understand that 
what their religion contains are parables.”60 But if true religion coincides with true 
philosophy on the allegorical level, then the difference between the two — which 
seemed to be implied in the notion of “imitation” — disappears. Only taken literally, 
religion is an imitation of philosophy. Taken allegorically religion and philosophy are 
the same. 
Al-Fârâbî is now in a position to respond to al-Kindî and the Christian authorities 
that there is no need to either compromise philosophy or prohibit part of its teachings. 
For once understood correctly, a virtuous religion is in complete agreement with 
philosophy. He can also respond to Abu Bakr al-Râzî that the literal content of the 
prophetic teachings is not redundant because God did not bestow equal intellectual 
abilities on all human beings.61 As a consequence, the intellect is not sufficient to 
guide all of them to perfection and happiness. 
Two final points must be added to this outline in order to understand how it in-
forms the relationship between philosophy and exegesis in Averroes and Maimon-
ides. Firstly, al-Fârâbî subdivides the group of non-philosophers into two sub-
groups : the majority which is guided by poetic, dialectical, and rhetorical means and 
                                       
 59. See e.g. Ta╕├îl, Ar. 184 ; Eng. 44. Cf. BLACK, Logic. 
 60. ╖urûf, 149. 
 61. Note, however, that Râzî in some texts, notably in his philosophical Apology, appears to subscribe to intel-
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a minority which knows things “according to their true nature through the insights of 
the philosophers, following them, assenting to their views and trusting them.”62 In 
other words, these non-philosophers apprehend things not in form of poetic imita-
tions, but as they truly are. They do not, however, assent to them on account of dem-
onstrations, but on account of the authority of the philosophers. Secondly, the group 
of philosophers and non-philosophers are not entirely static for al-Fârâbî. In the 
Mabâdi’, for instance, he describes the different stages in the long process leading to 
intellectual perfection — from the inborn natural disposition to receive intelligibles to 
the final state in which it can be said that “the active intellect has descended” on a 
person.63 The implication is that nobody is born a philosopher. At the beginning of 
their intellectual careers the potential philosophers, like the non-philosophers, will 
not be able to grasp the true nature of things by means of demonstration. Like every-
body else their understanding will be shaped by poetical, rhetorical, and dialectical 
devices.64 In contrast to non-philosophers, however, the philosophers will reject the 
parables imitating philosophical doctrines as inadequate and false, once they advance 
in their education and apprehend things according to their true nature. This I take to 
be the group that al-Fârâbî in the Mabâdi’ calls the “seekers of the right path [al-
mustarashidûn] :” 
It is not impossible that among those who know these things through imitating parables, 
there is someone who puts his finger on the grounds for objection to those parables and 
holds that they are inadequate and false. There are different kinds of these people : first 
those who seek the right path. When one of them rejects anything as false, he will be ele-
vated [rufi‛a] towards a better parable which is nearer to the truth and is not open to that 
objection ; and if he is satisfied with it, he will be left where he is. When that better par-
able is also rejected by him as false, he will be elevated to another rank, and if he is then 
satisfied with it, he will be left where he is. Whenever a parable of a given standard is re-
jected by him as false, he will be elevated to a higher rank, but when he rejects all the par-
ables as false and has the strength to understand the truth, he will be made to know the 
truth and will be placed into the class of those who take the philosophers as their authori-
ties. If he is not yet satisfied with that and desires philosophical wisdom [tashawwaqa ilâ 
al-╕ikma] and has the strength for it, he will be made to know it.65 
It now turns out that the philosopher-prophet who rules the virtuous community has 
one additional pedagogical task. Besides instructing philosophers by means of dem-
onstrations and making the true nature of things as much as possible accessible to 
non-philosophers by means of imitations, he also gradually “elevates” potential phi-
losophers, who are advancing on the “right path,” from the imitations back to the true 
nature of things. The “seekers of the right path” react, in fact, in a way similar to the 
philosophers living in a community which has adopted its religion and its philosophy 
from another community and who fail to realize that the former is an imitation of the 
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 63. Mabâdi’ 15, secs. 9-10. 
 64. Recall that in the passage from Falsafat Aflâ└ûn discussed above, al-Fârâbî mentions two groups whose 
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latter. In both cases the imitations are rejected as false, because they are understood 
literally. Once the imitation is recognized as imitation and its allegorical content as 
true there is no longer reason for rejecting it. Thus “elevating” potential philosophers 
to understanding the true nature of things means both, elevating them to philosophy 
and to the allegorical content of religion. 
II. AVERROES AND MAIMONIDES : 
DISCIPLES OF AL-FÂRÂBÎ ? 
It is, of course, not difficult to identify Averroes’ commentaries on Aristotle as 
continuing what I characterized as the first aspect of al-Fârâbî’s project. Averroes 
shares al-Fârâbî’s high opinion of Aristotle. In his Long Commentary on the De an-
ima he writes, for example : “I think that this man [Aristotle] was a model in nature 
and the instantiation that nature found for showing the highest human perfection.”66 
The twin reasons that I suggested motivated al-Fârâbî’s project as a commentator on 
Aristotle apply to Averroes too : attaining happiness and human perfection and en-
suring the continuity of the transmission of philosophy. But Averroes, in addition to 
taking up the project of al-Fârâbî, also builds on al-Fârâbî’s contributions to it. Thus 
we learn from Ibn ┘umlûs, a student of Averroes, that al-Fârâbî’s works on logic 
were considered the most accurate introduction to the subject.67 Averroes’ explana-
tion of the legitimacy of his commentaries from the point of view of Islam follows 
from al-Fârâbî’s premises, but is not made explicit by al-Fârâbî. To understand it we 
must first examine how Averroes conceives the relationship between philosophy and 
Islam. 
In general, Averroes adopts the Platonic interpretation of religion that we have 
seen in al-Fârâbî. This becomes particularly clear in his commentary on Plato’s Re-
public in which he frequently quotes important passages from al-Fârâbî’s works.68 
But for the application of this conceptual framework to the interpretation of Islam as 
a philosophical religion we have to turn to Averroes’ philosophical-theological trea-
tises of which the most important is the Fa├l al-maqâl wa-taqrîr ma bayn al-sharî‛a 
wa-al-╕ikma min al-itti├âl [Decisive Treatise and Determination of the Relationship 
between the Divine Law and Philosophy]. Averroes’ fundamental assumption con-
cerning this relationship is the following : 
Since this Law [sharî‛a] is true and calls to the reflection leading to cognition of the truth, 
we, the Muslim community, know firmly that demonstrative reflection cannot lead to 
something differing with what is set down in the Law. For the truth does not contradict the 
truth [al-╕aqq lâ yu┬┬âd al-╕aqq] ; rather, it agrees with and bears witness to it.69 
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Averroes, of course, knows that this cannot be the case if the sharî‛a is understood 
literally. For then it contains much that is at odds with what philosophy demonstrates. 
The reason for this is that for Averroes, like for Plato and al-Fârâbî, there is an im-
portant “‘difference in human nature [ikhtilâf fi└ra al-nâs],” namely that between 
philosophers and non-philosophers, and that the divine Law is addressed to all Mus-
lims, and not only to the philosophers among them.70 To achieve this, the prophet 
proceeds as follows : for one thing he calls the philosophers to pursue true knowledge 
on the basis of demonstrations. In addition he translates this knowledge by means of 
rhetorical and dialectical arguments, as well as poetic representations into a language 
accessible to non-philosophers. As a consequence, contradictions arise between the 
literal sense of the divine Law and the doctrines demonstrated by the philosophers. 
These contradictions can be solved, according to Averroes, through “exegesis 
[ta’wîl]” which discloses the “allegorical sense [bâ└in]” of the divine Law.71 Up to 
this point, Averroes follows al-Fârâbî fairly closely. He goes one step beyond al-
Fârâbî, however by expressly confining allegorical exegesis to the philosophers. As 
far as I can see, nothing in Averroes corresponds to the educated audience to whom 
al-Fârâbî thought philosophy could be disclosed in a non-demonstrative manner.72 
The difference between philosophers and non-philosophers with respect to the truth is 
thus twofold : Only the philosophers have access to the truth through scientific dem-
onstrations and only the philosophers have access to the “allegorical sense” of the di-
vine Law. For Averroes pointing out in public that the literal sense of the divine Law 
is false and disclosing its allegorical sense would precisely undermine the intention of 
the prophet who concealed the allegorical sense because of the “difference in human 
nature.” Averroes explains this by drawing an analogy between the role of the medi-
cal doctor and the role of the lawgiver in which he opposes the lawgiver to the person 
who intends to disclose the allegorical content of the divine Law : 
Here is a parable of these people’s intention as contrasted to the intention of the Lawgiver 
[al-shâri‛] : Someone intends [to go] to a skilled physician who intends to preserve the 
health of all of the people and to remove sickness from them by setting down for them 
prescriptions to which there is common assent [mushtarakat al-ta├dîq] about the obliga-
tion of practicing the things that preserve their health and remove their sickness, as well as 
of avoiding the contrary things. He is not able to make them all become physicians, be-
cause the physician is the one who knows by demonstrative methods [bi-al-└uruq al-
burhânîyya] the things that preserve health and remove sickness. Then this one [the alle-
gorical exegete] goes out to the people and says to them : “These methods this physician 
has set down for you are not true.” And he sets about rejecting them until they have re-
jected them. Or he says : “They have interpretations.” Yet they do not understand [these 
interpretations] and thus come to no assent as to what to do because of them.73 
To the “health” in the parable corresponds the perfection and happiness to which the 
prophet and lawgiver intends to lead all human beings to the extent that they can at-
                                       
 70. Fa├l, 10. 
 71. For this argument, see in particular ibid., 8, 19, 24-25 ; cf. Kashf, Ar. 132-135 ; Eng. 16-19. 
 72. In fact, Averroes diagnoses that the soul of the mutakallimûn is sick, because they neither accept religion 
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tain it. To the “prescriptions” corresponds the divine Law. What Averroes means is 
that if the beliefs based on the literal sense of the divine Law are taken away from 
non-philosophers who do not understand the allegorical sense, because they lack the 
required intellectual abilities for understanding it, than these non-philosophers will 
fall into nihilism. For they will not follow the guidance of the lawgiver on account of 
its literal sense which has lost its authority for them, nor will they follow it on ac-
count of the allegorical sense, because they do not understand it. They loose, for in-
stance, their belief in God as a king who rewards the obedient and punishes the dis-
obedient. At the same time they are unable to understand the notion of a first cause 
and how it relates to a virtuous life. Hence they loose both their belief in God and 
their belief in the value of a virtuous life. It may be noted that Averroes’ critique of 
publicly interpreting the divine Law has the same rationale as Plato’s critique of sub-
jecting non-philosophers to elenchoi. Again and again Averroes stresses that the alle-
gorical sense of the divine Law is not to be made public. His sharp criticism of Mus-
lim theologians who “strayed and led astray” is motivated above all by the fact that 
they “revealed their allegorical interpretation to the multitude [├ara╕û bi-ta’wîlihim 
li-l-jumhûr],” i.e. did not respect the divisions due to the “difference in human na-
ture.”74 
Let us now return to Averroes’ commentaries on Aristotle. To the extent that he 
took them to have established true philosophical doctrines by means of demonstra-
tions he must have considered them as coinciding with the allegorical content of the 
divine Law. But here a question arises : does not setting these doctrines forth in 
books that in principle can be read by non-philosophers transgress the strict prohibi-
tion of disclosing the divine Law’s allegorical content ? To this Averroes responds 
that books that “use demonstrations are accessible only to those who understand 
demonstrations.”75 In other words, Averroes takes his commentaries on Aristotle to 
be protected from non-philosophers on account of their difficulty. This is an original 
point. Both al-Fârâbî and Maimonides distinguish between two kinds of esoteric 
writing : the use of “parables and riddles” on the one hand and the use of “obscurity 
and brevity” on the other.76 To this Averroes adds a third kind : difficulty. 
Unlike al-Fârâbî, Averroes conceives the relationship between philosophers and 
non-philosophers as static. As far as I can see, Averroes does not consider the case of 
the “seekers of the right path” who must be successively elevated to levels of under-
standing of the divine Law closer to the truth in correspondence with their intellectual 
progress. 
Precisely al-Fârâbî’s concept of the “seekers of the right path” provides, on the 
other hand, a key to understanding Maimonides’ project. As I stressed in the intro-
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duction : Maimonides’ work could hardly be more different than that of Averroes. He 
is, above all, a commentator on the Law of Moses and not a commentator on Aris-
totle. He does, on the other hand, share all the premises informing al-Fârâbî’s and 
Averroes’ Platonic interpretation of religion and uses them to present Judaism as a 
philosophical religion : the assumption that human beings are by nature unequal and 
hence subdivided into philosophers and non-philosophers, the notion of the prophet-
philosopher who has a perfect intellect as well as a perfect imagination and who 
teaches philosophers by means of demonstrations and non-philosophers by means of 
rhetorical, dialectical, and poetical devices, the importance of concealing the allegori-
cal content of the divine Law for the protection of non-philosophers — all these ele-
ments can be found in Maimonides as well.77 This notwithstanding, the Guide is pre-
sented as a book of Biblical exegesis. To understand why, it is important to clarify 
who the “perplexed” are whom Maimonides is addressing. In the introduction to the 
Guide, Maimonides characterizes the “perplexed” person as a Jewish intellectual who 
has “studied the sciences of the philosophers and come to know what they signify :” 
The human intellect having drawn him on and let him to dwell within its province, he 
must have felt distressed by the literal meanings of the Law [zawâhîr al-sharî‛a] […] as 
he continued to understand them by himself or was made to understand them by others. 
Hence he would remain in a state of perplexity and confusion as to whether he should 
follow his intellect, renounce what he knew concerning the terms in question, and conse-
quently consider that he has renounced the foundations of the Law. Or he should hold fast 
to his understanding […] of these terms and not let himself be drawn on together with his 
intellect, rather turning his back on it and moving away from it, while at the same time 
perceiving that he had brought loss to himself and harm to his religion. He would be left 
with those imaginary beliefs [al-i‛tiqadât al-khayâliyya] to which he owes his fear and 
difficulty and would not cease from heartache and great perplexity.78 
In al-Fârâbî’s words from the characterization of the “seekers of the right path” one 
could say that the Jewish intellectual has “put his finger on the grounds for objection” 
to many terms and parables in the divine Law because he recognized them as “inade-
quate and false,” i.e. because they do not correspond to the true nature of things. And 
the philosophical-exegetical program of the Guide is precisely a response to this 
situation. As I mentioned above, Maimonides’ purpose is “to give indications [tan-
bîh]” by explaining “the meaning of certain terms” and “very obscure parables occur-
ring in the books of the prophets.” In a sense, therefore, it seems that the project of 
the Guide can be characterized as “elevating” Jewish intellectuals from the literal 
sense of the divine Law, designed according to pedagogical and political considera-
tions for non-philosophers, to the allegorical sense of the divine Law, corresponding 
to the “truth as it is” and accessible only to philosophers. Maimonides, in fact, de-
scribes the process of “elevating” potential philosophers who are on the way to be-
coming actual philosophers in detail in Guide I, 33. And in the “Epistle Dedicatory,” 
which prefaces the Guide, he presents himself precisely in the role of the teacher 
                                       
 77. I have given a systematic account of Maimonides’ position in From Maimonides to Samuel ibn Tibbon : 
The Transformation of the Dalâlat al-╖â’irîn into the Moreh ha-Nevukhim, Jerusalem, The Hebrew Uni-
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when portraying his relationship to Joseph ben Judah, his beloved student, whose de-
parture prompted, according to the Epistle, the composition of the Guide. But while 
Joseph fits neatly into al-Fârâbî’s account of the “seekers of the right path,” the term 
can only in a qualified way be applied to the perplexed Jewish intellectuals described 
in the Guide’s introduction who already are philosophers but fail to understand the 
relationship between philosophy and religion. As a consequence they resemble more 
al-Fârâbî’s philosophers living in a community which has adopted its religion and 
philosophy from another community without at first recognizing that the former imi-
tates the latter. For although Maimonides claims that in the remote past philosophy 
was part of Judaism, he also claims that this ancient Jewish wisdom was lost in the 
course of the Diaspora history of the Jewish people.79 Jewish intellectuals of later 
times must, therefore, learn philosophy from non-Jewish authors which in Maimon-
ides’ case means from Greco-Arabic sources.80 As a consequence they do not recog-
nize the literal content of their religion to be an imitation of philosophy. If, therefore, 
we are to characterize Maimonides’ purpose in the Guide within the conceptual frame-
work of al-Fârâbî, my first suggestion would be that he carries out one aspect of the 
pedagogical task which al-Fârâbî attributes to the prophet-philosopher : he shows 
Jewish philosophers who take the literal sense of the divine Law to be “inadequate 
and false” how to coordinate the knowledge acquired from non-Jewish sources with 
the divine Law by “elevating” them from its literal to its allegorical content.81 But like 
Averroes, Maimonides holds that publicly teaching philosophy and disclosing the 
allegorical content of the divine Law will not only cause “confusion” in the beliefs of 
non-philosophers but will ultimately lead to their “absolute negation [ta‛└îl ma╕┬].”82 
For this reason one would expect the Guide to refrain from straightforward philoso-
phical exegesis. Maimonides indeed claims to have concealed its content by means of 
esoteric devices — not through the difficulty of Averroes’ “books of demonstration,” 
nor through the “parables and riddles” used by the prophets, but through obscuring 
his argumentation by means of deliberate disorder and contradictions.83 
But why did Maimonides not write commentaries on Aristotle ? After all, since 
the alleged ancient Jewish wisdom was lost, studying Greco-Arabic philosophy is the 
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only way to gain access to the allegorical content of the divine Law. Moreover, in a 
letter to Samuel ibn Tibbon, who translated the Guide from Arabic to Hebrew, Mai-
monides highly praises Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition, in particular Alexan-
der, Themistius, al-Fârâbî, Ibn Bâjja, and Averroes. And like al-Fârâbî and Averroes, 
Maimonides takes Aristotle to have “reached the highest degree of human knowl-
edge.”84 In a sense one could argue that Maimonides’ conception of Jewish wisdom 
precludes commentaries on Aristotle. For had he justified composing commentaries 
on Aristotle because their difficulty prevented them from being studied by non-phi-
losophers, he would have had to explain why no ancient Jewish philosophical texts 
are extant. Maimonides, in fact, insists that in Antiquity philosophy was transmitted 
only orally from one generation of Jewish sages to the next until historical circum-
stances interrupted the chain of transmission.85  
In light of Maimonides’ insistence on concealment, however, it should be all the 
more surprising that much of the Guide — and most strikingly the first part — is de-
voted to a straightforward explanation of the allegorical meaning of terms and par-
ables occurring in the divine Law. These explanations are, after all, accessible to 
anyone who can read. Maimonides, it seems, does precisely what Averroes (and he 
himself !) stressed must be avoided. The reason for this, I contend, is that much of the 
Guide is based on a creative adaptation of the concept of “elevating” the “seekers of 
the right path” to which there is no counterpart in either al-Fârâbî or Averroes. For 
Maimonides not only Jewish philosophers need to be “elevated” from the literal to 
the allegorical content of the divine Law, but to some extent non-philosophers as 
well. Non-philosophers, of course, cannot acquire knowledge by means of demon-
strations. But they can, according to Maimonides, be habituated to opinions that cor-
respond to the true nature of things. Maimonides thinks it possible for non-philoso-
phers to acquire opinions through habituation that coincide with the knowledge 
acquired by philosophers through demonstration. The most important example for 
this in the Guide is the doctrine of God’s incorporeality.86 This doctrine “ought to be 
inculcated in virtue of traditional authority [taqlîd] upon children, women, stupid 
ones, and those of a defective natural disposition, just as they adopt the notion that 
God is one, that He is eternal, and that none but He should be worshipped. For there 
is no profession of unity [taw╕îd] unless the doctrine of God’s corporeality is de-
nied.” But this doctrine is obviously at odds with much of what the Bible has to say 
about God : 
When people have received this doctrine, are habituated to and educated […] in it, and 
subsequently become perplexed over the texts of the books of the prophets, the meaning 
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of these books should be explained to them. They should be elevated to the knowledge of 
the interpretation of these texts [unhi┬û’ li-ta’wîlihâ], and their attention should be drawn 
to the equivocality and allegorical sense of the various terms — the exposition of which is 
contained in this Treatise — so that the correctness of their belief regarding the oneness of 
God and the affirmation of the truth of the books of the prophets should be safe.87 
On the basis of the expanded version of Aristotle’s Organon, al-Fârâbî and Averroes 
distinguished between the demonstrative, dialectical, rhetorical, and poetical method 
of disseminating knowledge. To these four methods Maimonides adds a fifth that is 
not derived from the same conceptual framework : “inculcation in virtue of tradi-
tional authority.” Here al-Fârâbî meets the Almohads, i.e. the “professors of God’s 
unity [muwa╕╕idûn]” who made the strict understanding of taw╕îd — God’s unity as 
entailing God’s incorporeality — into the official doctrine of the Almohad kingdom 
that all subjects, independently of their intellectual abilities, were forced to profess.88 
It seems that Maimonides supported this aspect of the Almohad project which he 
thought would lead — for example with regard to the doctrine of God’s incorporeal-
ity — to the habituation of non-philosophers to an opinion that is not an imitation of 
the true nature of God but an accurate description of it. The implicit assumption 
seems to be that in this manner the truth can be progressively disclosed to non-phi-
losophers. Moses habituated them to the belief in God’s numerical unity thus turning 
them away from pagan polytheism. But since, according to Maimonides, “a sudden 
transition from one opposite to another is impossible […] man, according to his na-
ture, is not capable of abandoning suddenly all to which he was accustomed.”89 
Hence Moses did not impose the belief in God’s incorporeality as well. But in Mai-
monides’ time the commitment to God’s numerical unity could be taken for granted. 
Thus he can introduce a further aspect of the true notion of God by means of habitua-
tion. Plato and Averroes expected non-philosophers to fall into nihilism if their tradi-
tional beliefs were called into doubt because of their inability to replace them through 
true ones. Maimonides, by contrast, appears to think that this nihilism can be avoided 
if the true beliefs are gradually imposed through habituation. As a consequence of 
this habituation non-philosophers too will experience perplexity over the literal 
meaning of terms and parables contained in the divine Law which represent God in 
an anthropomorphic way. Maimonides response to this problem is again based on al-
Fârâbî : non-philosophers “should be elevated to the interpretation of these texts,” 
which is precisely what he claims to have accomplished “in this Treatise.” It turns 
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out, therefore, that much of the exegetical program of the Guide aims at resolving the 
perplexity of non-philosophers ! 
In the fist four chapters of the Mishneh Torah’s Commandments concerning the 
Foundations of the Law, Maimonides seems to extend the Almohad project of legis-
lating true opinions. Here again Maimonides does not teach philosophy by means of 
demonstration nor by means of rhetorical, dialectical, or poetic devices. Instead he 
imposes a succinct summary of Aristotelian metaphysics and physics through the 
authority of the law. In light of the passage just examined I would suggest that his 
long term goal was to habituate non-philosophers to the basic concepts of a sound 
scientific worldview. In his optimistic moments Maimonides may have thought it 
possible to “elevate” all non-philosophers through habituation to the intermediary 
class of citizens that we saw in al-Fârâbî : those who know the objects of physics and 
metaphysics “according to their true nature through the insight of the philosophers, 
following them, assenting to their views and trusting them.” One version of the con-
ception of progressively disclosing the divine Law’s allegorical content was adopted 
by Samuel ibn Tibbon, the founder of medieval Maimonideanism. It contributed con-
siderably to establishing philosophical commentaries on the Bible as one of the main 
genres of medieval Jewish philosophy.90 
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